Goliaths vs Davids

BuzzMD

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First off, if you are not reading the Smart Football blog, imo, you really should -- it is an amazing look into football.

His post today was about Goliaths vs Davids based on an article in New Yorker about full court press in a youth basketball game. http://smartfootball.blogspot.com/2009/05/david-strategies-and-goliath-strategies.html I highly recommend reading the blogpost as well as the article written in the New Yorker linked in the blogpost. Very interesting on number of levels, especially looking at when Davids fight Goliaths on their terms, not Goliath's.

The political scientist Ivan Arreguín-Toft recently looked at every war fought in the past two hundred years between strong and weak combatants. The Goliaths, he found, won in 71.5 per cent of the cases. That is a remarkable fact. Arreguín-Toft was analyzing conflicts in which one side was at least ten times as powerful — in terms of armed might and population — as its opponent, and even in those lopsided contests the underdog won almost a third of the time. . . .

What happened, Arreguín-Toft wondered, when the underdogs likewise acknowledged their weakness and chose an unconventional strategy? He went back and re-analyzed his data. In those cases, David’s winning percentage went from 28.5 to 63.6. When underdogs choose not to play by Goliath’s rules, they win, Arreguín-Toft concluded, “even when everything we think we know about power says they shouldn’t.”

Well, then he applies this argument to football, and this is where it gets to be Tech related. He thinks Johnson's offense is the great David strategy.

So those are some options. Interestingly, it could be argued that on offense, the best strategy might be something like the flexbone or another triple-option offense like Paul Johnson uses: it has big play potential (and thus can be a substitute for passing), yet carries the benefit of keeping the clock going, which works against pass-first underdogs.

Again, if you have 15-30 minutes today, read both articles...I highly recommend them as the info about David vs Goliaths is fascinating, imo.
 
What happened, Arreguín-Toft wondered, when the underdogs likewise acknowledged their weakness and chose an unconventional strategy? He went back and re-analyzed his data. In those cases, David’s winning percentage went from 28.5 to 63.6. When underdogs choose not to play by Goliath’s rules, they win, Arreguín-Toft concluded, “even when everything we think we know about power says they shouldn’t.”

I wonder what happened when the Goliath's also discarded standard rules and chose to completely destroy their enemies. Ironically, this is the strategy David took as king when dealing with neighboring states.

It is also the strategy Paul Johnson used once he got his GSU teams rolling. He utterly destroyed opponents with the sole goal of ending the game before it could get out of hand.
 
I wonder what happened when the Goliath's also discarded standard rules and chose to completely destroy their enemies. Ironically, this is the strategy David took as king when dealing with neighboring states.

It is also the strategy Paul Johnson used once he got his GSU teams rolling. He utterly destroyed opponents with the sole goal of ending the game before it could get out of hand.

Wracer, that might be the 37 percent wins that Goliath had.
 
I wonder what happened when the Goliath's also discarded standard rules and chose to completely destroy their enemies. Ironically, this is the strategy David took as king when dealing with neighboring states.

It is also the strategy Paul Johnson used once he got his GSU teams rolling. He utterly destroyed opponents with the sole goal of ending the game before it could get out of hand.

I think the stronger meaning from the article is that the Goliath juggernaught plays their vanilla game and uses their Goliath-ness to win while the David has to really mix/shake things up to hopefully get an advantage. He basically says the David strategies will create a possibility (highly relying on luck) to win but it can also cause you to get your ass handed to you (like a fake punt on your 20...). Goliath's won't do that because they already have the advantage and have no need to risk things with crazy scheme's.

Looking back you can tell that LSU was playing with the belief that they were the underdog. Combine that with our own f-ups and look what ya get...
 
There is certainly validity to his points regarding David's adopting a strategy that suits them and creates a challenge in preparation for their Goliath opponents. This runs parallel to business philosophies of entering a market, a newcomer must offer something different than the established companies, but must also capitalize by doing something that the encumbent cannot easily copy or produce chepaer. Often this manifests itself in being more flexible both in production and thinking or catering to a market that the encumbent has not reached or no longer cares about. Johnson's offense combined with his football accumen and an intelligent team create a David style offense that worked well at Navy and at GT so far. Another facet to this is that option football has been written off by the masses who crave the seemingly more glitzy pass happy and pro-style offenses.
The key for the Goliath is to maintain their focus and direction, but to always be aware of new trends and keep their style progressing. However since college football requires recruiting and large amounts of training and consistency to yield great results, dominant programs will not suceed by changing their strategy frequently. Ones personell must match ones style and be consistent over a time to draw top notch players to the system and continue the cyle.
In this sense the flexbone is a David strategy, but also can be successful for a Goliath as it does not entail much of the variance that is more typical of a David stretegy. I would argue that the air attack spread offenses employed by Hawaii and Texas Tech are more prototypical David strategies in that they have more potential for turnover but also a high chance of scoring alot of points fast.
 
Malcolm Gladwell used that point in the New Yorker article. He is particularly critical of bad professional franchises who don't adopt an unorthodox strategy. For instance, the LA Clippers should try and full-court press their opponents. If it backfires, they aren't losing much. He talked about it extensively in his debate with Bill Simmons on page 2 yesterday.
 
Malcolm Gladwell used that point in the New Yorker article. He is particularly critical of bad professional franchises who don't adopt an unorthodox strategy. For instance, the LA Clippers should try and full-court press their opponents. If it backfires, they aren't losing much. He talked about it extensively in his debate with Bill Simmons on page 2 yesterday.

The Hawks should have full court pressed Lebron James with Mario West all game every game. Who cares if West fouls the hell out of him or gets tired? Maybe it would have tired him out for games 3 and 4 or frustrated him and made him play outside of his team.
 
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